

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

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October 2, 2026

The Honorable Kash Patel
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Director Patel,

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Democrats are investigating the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Request for Proposal (RFP) to acquire nationwide access to a network of automatic license plate readers (ALPR) that can offer "near real time" information from cameras across the United States.¹ ALPRs deployed across the United States constitute a sprawling, interconnected surveillance network that can be searched across state lines with little oversight. The FBI's plan to obtain direct access to this extensive network of cameras raises the risk of a substantial violation of Americans' privacy. The Committee requests information from the FBI to assist with its oversight of law enforcement's use of ALPR data.

In May 2026, the FBI issued an RFP to acquire ALPR systems that offer the ability to search for license plate information "and other descriptive data such as vehicle description information, time/date criteria, and geo-location criteria."² Currently, vendors including Flock and Motorola Solutions, whose ALPR systems are used by local police departments, likely possess the capabilities to satisfy this RFP.³ The RFP, which requested an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) license for social media and monitoring and ALPR systems, creates another surveillance vector for an administration thoroughly opposed to any oversight or accountability.⁴ While the FBI already runs a License Plate Reader (LPR) program through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) to facilitate LPR information sharing with and between its law enforcement partners, the FBI's plan to obtain direct access to an extensive network of cameras—such as those operated by Flock and Motorola—would dramatically

¹ Sam.gov, *License Plate Reader IDIQ for FBI Directorate of Intelligence Attachment 1* (online at <https://sam.gov/workspace/contract/opp/33a5c6f72cdd41e7bf5b6504e4ab8fbd/view>) (accessed Sept. 14, 2026).

² *Id.*

³ See *FBI Seeks US-Wide Access to License Plate Cameras, Wants "Data In Near Real Time,"* Ars Technica (May 19, 2026) (online at <https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2026/05/fbi-seeks-us-wide-access-to-license-plate-cameras-wants-data-in-near-real-time/>).

⁴ Sam.gov, *License Plate Reader IDIQ for FBI Directorate of Intelligence Attachment 1* (online at <https://sam.gov/workspace/contract/opp/33a5c6f72cdd41e7bf5b6504e4ab8fbd/view>) (accessed Sept. 14, 2026).

expand the license plate data currently held by the FBI and institute “near real time” surveillance of civilians.

Americans’ privacy has already been seriously violated due to the misuse of ALPR data, raising serious concerns about expanding the use of this technology by federal law enforcement agencies. Through law enforcement partnerships with Flock, Motorola, and similar companies, Americans who are not engaged in criminal activity already have their movements and vehicle information stored in databases accessible to law enforcement. This information can be used to create a profile of individuals’ appearance and behavior and has already reportedly been used inappropriately by law enforcement. For example, a Texas police department scanned more than 80,000 ALPRs to follow a woman suspected of self-administering an abortion across state lines.⁵ A July 2026 study by the Institute for Justice found that police have used Flock cameras and other ALPR systems to stalk romantic interests at least 26 times in recent years.⁶ *The Washington Post* recently reported that “[a]t least 69 police officials have been accused, charged with or convicted of misusing Flock’s system or other license-plate readers for unauthorized purposes.”⁷ In addition, public media reports have found police departments around the country have used Flock cameras hundreds of times to search for characteristics and features associated with people—not cars. These searches include features like tattoos, specific sports shirts, and race. The cameras are clearly capable of doing more than scanning license plates and tracking vehicles, instead following the movements of particular people or groups.⁸

Concerns about Flock’s credibility, and the inadequacy of the company’s internal safeguards also raise serious questions about whether federal law enforcement should have greater access to ALPR data. Flock has also repeatedly misled city councils, police departments, and the public about its data storage and sharing practices.⁹ In Colorado, Loveland Police Chief Tim Doran raised concerns that federal agents were accessing the town’s ALPR data. Flock responded by telling the Chief that federal agencies no longer had access to Loveland’s license plate readers. But after contradictory information came to light, the company was forced to admit that it did, in fact, have contracts with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Homeland Security Investigations for pilot projects that gave those agencies direct access to license plate

⁵ *A Texas Cop Searched License Plate Cameras Nationwide for a Woman Who Got an Abortion*, 404 Media (May 29, 2025) (online at www.404media.co/a-texas-cop-searched-license-plate-cameras-nationwide-for-a-woman-who-got-an-abortion/).

⁶ Institute for Justice, *Police Have Reportedly Used License Plate Readers to Stalk Romantic Interests Dozens of Times in Recent Years* (Apr. 27, 2026) (online at <https://ij.org/police-have-reportedly-used-license-plate-readers-to-stalk-romantic-interests-at-least-14-times-in-recent-years/?ref=404media.co>).

⁷ *Police Departments Weren’t Looking for Officers Abusing Flock. We Did It for Them*, Washington Post (Aug. 19, 2026) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2026/08/19/we-found-cops-who-misused-flock-their-police-departments-didnt-know/).

⁸ *How Cops Use Flock to Track People, Not Cars*, 404 Media (July 16, 2026) (online at www.404media.co/how-cops-use-flock-to-track-people-not-cars/).

⁹ *Flock Safety Credibility Lost as it Repeatedly Lies to City Councils, Police Departments, and Public Across the Country*, ACLU (July 2, 2026) (online at www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/tracking-alpr-cameras/flock-safety-credibility-lost-as-it-repeatedly-lies-to-city-councils-police-departments-and-public-across-the-country).

data.¹⁰ During an August 26, 2026, staff level briefing with Flock, Flock representatives maintained that the company no longer conducts pilot programs with federal agencies; however, Flock representatives confirmed ongoing contracts with federal agencies but did not disclose specifics.¹¹ This lack of transparency prevents the American people from understanding the extent to which the federal government can access and track their location using information collected by Flock cameras. Granting the FBI direct access to Flock cameras would exacerbate this concern, allowing federal law enforcement to access individuals' image and location data without their awareness.

Local communities across the U.S. are increasingly rejecting ALPR systems. Fifty-three officials across 20 states have terminated or rejected contracts with Flock.¹² The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) recently ended its contract with Flock after an audit found that in a two-month period, the LAPD had improperly "investigated" 161 people whose cars were incorrectly flagged as stolen in the ALPR system.¹³ The American people are clearly concerned about law enforcement having access to Flock data and about government surveillance more broadly. Entering into a contract that would give the nation's largest law enforcement agency access to Flock data across the country would subvert the clear preference of the American people.

To assist the Committee in conducting oversight into the security of Americans' data and the FBI's planned increased use of mass surveillance systems, we request the following information as soon as possible but no later than October 16, 2026:

1. A detailed list of the features the FBI currently has access to through existing contracts and data sharing programs across all Flock, Motorola, and any other locational surveillance products;
2. A detailed description of the FBI's intended use of the ALPR data it collects and the legal justification for said use;
3. A detailed description of the data storage practices the FBI will utilize with regard to ALPR data, including information on how the FBI will address existing data storage vulnerabilities with Flock and Motorola systems;

¹⁰ "Work Boots and Subaru": Local Officials Say the Backlash Against Flock Cameras Is Becoming Bipartisan, Politico (Aug. 6, 2026) (online at www.politico.com/news/2026/08/09/flock-cameras-backlash-cancellations-01026242).

¹¹ Briefing by Flock Safety, to Democratic Staff, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Aug. 26, 2026).

¹² *Flock Safety Crosses 100,000 Cameras as 53 Cities Cancel Over Unauthorized Federal Data Access*, Tech Times (June 29, 2026) (online at www.techtimes.com/articles/319317/20260629/flock-safety-crosses-100000-cameras-53-cities-cancel-over-unauthorized-federal-data-access.htm).

¹³ *LAPD Regularly Pulled Over Innocent People Because License Plate Readers Flagged Their Cars as Stolen*, 404 Media (July 13, 2026) (online at www.404media.co/lapd-regularly-pulled-over-innocent-people-because-license-plate-readers-flagged-their-cars-as-stolen/).

4. A detailed description of how the FBI intends to share ALPR data with other federal agencies and local law enforcement, including immigration agencies like CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
5. A detailed description of how this new contract will be added to the vehicle data that the FBI already collects through its LPR program; and
6. A detailed description and list of which policies and safeguards the FBI will implement to prevent abuse and authorized access to ALPR tools and data.

The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform is the principal oversight committee of the House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time” under House Rule X. If you have any questions about this request, please contact Committee Democratic staff at (202) 225-5051. Thank you for your prompt attention to this request.

Sincerely,



Greg Casar
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Federal
Law Enforcement



Shontel Brown
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Information Technology, and
Government Innovation

cc: The Honorable James Comer, Chair
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

The Honorable Clay Higgins, Chair
Subcommittee on Federal Law Enforcement

The Honorable Nancy Mace, Chair
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Information Technology, and Government Innovation